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INTRODUCTION 
During the l ast three decades , there has been a significant 
growth in t he outdoo r rec reation industry . In 1969, the re were 17.6 
million vis its to national parks , and by 1978, that number had 
increased to 283 .1 million (Gregory, 1972; u.s. Dept. of Commerce , 
1979) . Simila rly, visits to national forests grew from 5 million in 
1925 to over 147 mi ll ion in 1965 (Clawson and Knetsch , 1966). 
There are many factors that would account for such a strong, 
steady increase in outdoor recreation participation . One of the most 
obvious reasons 1·1ould be the post - \,orld War II "baby boom". Such a 
l arge increase in the U. S. populatio n has undoubtedly increased the 
number of recreators. Increasing worker productivity has not only pro-
vided additiona l disposable income, but has also provided more leisure 
time. Thus, individuals may work less and have more money and time 
with 1vhich to recreate . A more subtle factor may be that increasing 
urbanization has raised levels of psychological and emotional stress 
which in turn ha s created a demand for outdoor experiences as a means 
of "getting away from it all" . (Clawso n and Knetsch , 1966). 
Despite recent increases in wilderness acreage (providing a 
defacto increase in outdoor recreation acreage) , the growth in acreage 
has not kept pace with the growth in demand . It is primarily land 
that is used to produce outdoor recreation services. From 1950 to 
1978, total national park acreage increased only 36% while na tional 
forest acreage has remained relatively unchanged for some time . 
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It is now clear that the demand for outdoor recreation has grown 
faster than its supply, or more correctly, the resources that produce 
its supply . This imbalance wou l d not pose too great a problem if the 
scarce resources used to produce outdoor recreation services were all o-
cated efficiently by some type of mechanism. In an economy such as 
ours this would imply the use of a market-type allocation scheme with 
prices as the rationing agent. However, outdoor recreation services 
are typically provided by the public sector at low, or zero, cost to all 
consumers. To many, outdoor recreation is considered a merit good and 
as such should be provided freel y to all those wishing to consume it. 
The lack of a market for outdoor recreation services creates some 
al l ocation problems . On the supply side, without market pricing, it 
is difficult for producers to determine the values placed on these ser-
vices by individuals. Hence, it is hard to determine if economi cally 
efficient quantities of resources have been devoted to producing 
various recreation services. 
On the demand side, an artifically low, or zero, price usually 
results in over consumption (i.e ., quantity demanded exceeds quantity 
supplied) of a resource, or the services it provides. For outdoor 
recreation, overcons umpti on is most noticible when there is congestion 
at a recreation site . 
Defined for outdoor recreation, congestion occurs when the addi-
tion of one more individual at a recreation site results in a decrease 
in utility for those already at that site. When congestion occ urs and 
to what extent it affects an individual's experiences depends on the 
site . For example, one would be more apt to experience high visita-
tion at a national park than at a wilderness area . However , the 
utility loss suffered by consumers of wilderness areas who face even 
small amounts of congestion may be greater than the utility loss of 
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a national park consumer facing congestion. This is due to the basic 
differences in expectations that each consumer places on a specific 
site, and/ or activity . 
Congestion is not only a function of numbers of people. There 
are increasing numbers of different types of recreators such as; 
hikers , skiers, and bi rd watchers. Conflict between two or more diff-
erent user groups has increased with the growth of outdoor recreation 
dema nd. Birdwatchers may be "disturbed" by hikers, cross-country 
skiers may be "bothered" by snowmobilers, or vice-versa, and so on. 
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NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
As a (quasi) public good, outdoor recreation resources are not 
rationed by prices , as are private goods . The demand fo r outdoor 
recreation has grown to the point where congestion encounters are 
commonplace . In order that they may provide a quality recreation 
experience to individuals resource managers should know the extent 
of the the congestion costs which consumers suffer . Only then will 
managers be able to achieve congestion reduction and/or prevention 
through the development of a pricing scheme, increasing the resources 
devoted to outdoor recreation, or a combination prices and resources 
increases. 
This study examined the congestion/conflict problem in Logan 
Canyon, Utah . In this recreation area there appears to be consider-
able antagonism between cross-country skiers and snow- machine riders. 
Those of the former group continual ly express (publicly) their 
dissatisfaction with having to recreate near or along side 
snowmobilers. The latter group feels that as taxpayers, they should 
be free to recreate wherever they wish . 
This study had two objectives: 
1. To examine any conflict between cross- country skie r s and 
snowmobile r s in the Logan Canyon Recreation Area (LCRA). 
2. To test the relative merits of travel - cost and bid game 
methodologies as suitable methods for estimating 
congestion impacts. 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Travel cost methodo logy 
Much of the early research on outdoor recreation benefit estima-
tion was developed by Marion Cl awson. He is generally credited with 
being the first to use the trave l costs to a recreation site as pr ice 
proxies in the estimation of demand curves for recreation resources 
(Clawson, 1959) . 
Clawson ' s procedure for estimating a demand curve involves a two 
stage process . First, data on travel costs are gath ered, usually 
th rough a survey, for different distance zones from the site . These 
costs are then regressed against levels of use. The resulting func-
tion is what Clawson calls •. "a demand curve for the entire recreation 
experience ." Included in this curve, in additio n to site specific 
benefits, are any benefits gene rated by the jointly consumed variables 
such as travel itself, food, and lodging. 
To isolate the site specific dema nd curve requires one more step. 
Using the function obtained i n stage one, which assumed nominal or 
zero entry fees and similar uti 1 ity functions for "average" users for 
each zone, cha nges in use rates can be extrapolated from the functions 
for hypothesized entry fees which yield a demand curve for the 
specific recreation opportunity. 
Several assumptions are made when using the Clawson approach . 
Income, tastes, and the marginal uti li ty of income for all users are 
all assumed to be constant. Individuals are also assumed to respond 
to a change in travel or entry costs in the same manner as any other 
price change . They may consume more or less recreation as prices vary, 
rather than seek political redress. Finally, time costs for indivi-
duals from different distance zones are considered insignificant, as 
are congestion levels for the sites where the estimations are made . 
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Trave l cost valuation schemes have proved to be popular due to 
their simplicity. Such methods have also been subject to considerable 
research aimed at exposing their strengths and weaknesses, both 
empirical and theoretical . 
Cesario and Knetsch (1970} questioned the assumption of constant 
time costs between distance zones . They felt that ignoring time costs 
differentia l s generates a downward bias in the demand function . To 
avoid this , they suggested the use of a time cost tradeoff function 
to correct the demand curve. However, they also recognized the high 
degree of correlation between time and distance, which makes the 
esti mation of a tradeoff function more art than science, given current 
statistica l procedures. They warned that a corrected demand curve may 
be no more accurate than the original. 
Sinden (1974} also objects to treating time costs as constant . 
Furthermore, he argues, bias is generated when tastes and an indivi -
dual's marginal utility of income are assumed to be unchanging. 
Si nden recommends empirically estimating individuals' utility func-
tions using estimated indifference curves . This method can all ow for 
changes in time costs, tastes, etc ••• Demand curves can then be 
derived from the utility functio ns . 
Congestion is another problem affecting the estimation of outdoor 
recreation demand curves . The increase in congestion encounters has 
piqued researchers' curiosity as to how congestion impacts affect 
benefits accruing to recreation sites and has been the subject of 
extensive study. Part of this research has examined the effects of 
congestion when using travel cost methods of benefit estimation. 
McConnel l and Duff (1976) have devP.loped a Model which indicates 
that under conditions of excess demand, travel cost methods 
underestimate the benefits accuring to the site by using standard 
utility maximazation procedures and incorporating travel costs into 
the recreators budget constraint the appropriate demand curve can be 
generated: 
where; 
X1 the number of trips to the site 
X2 all other goods 
t(d) round trip travel and transfer costs 
for a trip of lengt h d. 
Px1 entrance price of site, if any 
Px2 composite price for all other goods 
money income 
Maximizing L with respect to X1 yields the first order condition: 
This first order condition imp l ies an ordinary, per capita demand 
curve for X1 of the form: 
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where the income argument is dropped for convenience. 
The benefits accruing to any individual that is r1 miles from the 
site can be found by calculating the individual's consumer surplus: 
CSi 
Note that P -t(r) is the maximum amount a recreator will pay in fees 
and travel costs (i.e., the intercept of the demand curve on the price 
axis) . 
Estimating total site benefits requires the aggregation of all 
recreators' consumer's surplus (CSi) across distance zones: 
r P-t(r ) f o L(rlf 0 f[P+t(r)]dpdr 
where; 
L(r) = population density at distance r 
Since the equation for total consumer surplus (benefits) for the 
site is a monotonic transform of individual consumer surplus, anything 
that underestimates individual CS will underestimate aggregate CS. 
The development of the above expression for total site benefits 
requires three simplifying assumptions: 
1) Tastes do not vary with distance from the site. 
2) No utility is derived from travel or transfer spending . 
3) Individual's react identically to changes in t(r) or Px1. 
McConnell and Duff show that congestion causes behavior that 
violates assumption number 3 and hence, results in an underestimation 
of site benefits. 
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If it is assumed that recreation managers will limit site use 
when visitation exceeds some level, K, then individual's will not be 
certain as to their likelihood of admittance . Thus, their consumption 
decisions are based upon perceived demand (X*), not actual demand. 
The recreator still faces travel and entrance costs, and the addi-
tiona! uncertainty with respect to entry . The problem becomes: 
where; 
,z the probability of the recreator ga1mng entry 
based on perceived excess dema nd. 
All other variables are defined as befo re. The resulting first order 
condition is: 
which implies a demand function of the form: 
All that needs to be examined is the change in demand result ing 
from a change in either travel or entrance costs. 
1) ilnX1fdt(d) = f1 [t(d)/" + PxtJ/" 
2) anX1/ilPx1 = l [t(d)f>l + Px1J 
Clearl y, there is a difference between these t1~o expressions. Figure 
(1) shows this difference graphically. The slopes of d1 and d2 are 
given by equations 1 and 2 respectively. 
x* 
Fig . 1. Divergence of Recreation Demand curve slopes under 
conditions of excess demand. 
Curve d1 is more ela stic due to the uncertainty of being admitted . 
When travel costs increase, recreators reduce consumption partly 
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because price went up and part ly because they may not be admi tted . The 
demand curve estimated using the trave l costs methods is d1. There-
fore, when congestion is present at a site, benefits will be underesti-
mated when using travel cost methods . McCo nnell and Duff suggest that 
the demand functio n should be corrected by a factor of •I. 
It should be noted that McConnel l and Duff's model applies only to 
control led access recrea tion areas such as Ye ll owstone National Pa rk. 
Open access areas must be examined using other model s (see Cicchetti 
and Smith, 1973}. 
Wetze l (1977) has also shown that congest i on will cause a downward 
bias in travel - cost demand curves, but for reasons different from those 
of McCo nnell and Duff . Wetzel objects to holding congest ion levels 
constant when estimating demand curves . The following is a brief pre-
sentation of the Wetzel model . 
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11 
s 
X, X, 
Fig. 2. Loss of welfare due to 
a price increase. 
Fig . 3. Gain in welfare due to a 
price induced congestion 
decrease. 
Figures 2 and 3 represent typical site demand curves estimated 
with travel cost techniques. Travel costs are assumed to vary only 
with distance, hence the term price refers to entry fees . In figure 
2, a rise in price from P0 to P1 will cause use of the facility to 
decrease from X0 to X1 1 • Before the price change, site benefits v1ere 
P0AS . The price rise results in a decrease in benefits equal to the 
area CAB, leaving total site benefits of P0 CBS . Thus, Wetzel points 
out , the assumptio n of constant congestion levels necessitates a loss 
of social we lfare whenever the re is a price increase. 
Fig. 3 il lustrates the case of variable levels of congestion. If 
the price of entering a recreation area rises from P0 to P1, recreators 
will move along S from A to B. This decrease in consumption implies 
that congestion has also l essened somewhat . A decrease in congestion 
will causeS to shift outward to S' and so consumption will be at B' . 
The remaining consumers will consume more with a congestion decrease. 
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The increase in benefits is given by the area SS'BJ and the social 
l oss due to a price increase is AJJ. In this case, a net loss in 
soc ial benefits will occur only if AIJ exceeds SS ' BJ and there is no 
approp riate reason why it would (or would not). Repeated appl ica-
tions of the above procedure will trace out a new demand curve, DCA· 
Embodied in this curve are the effects that different congestion 
levels have on use rates. Freeman {1976) calls this type of curve a 
congestion-adjusted demand curve. The congestion adjusted curve is 
less elastic tha n a standard travel cost curve, generating an under-
estimation of site benefits when congestion levels are held constant. 
Wetzel asserts that there are two effects that must be taken 
into consideration when estimating site benefits: (1) McConnell and 
Duff's effect resulting from the possibi lity of exclusion, and {2) 
the price induced effect postu lated by Wetzel . Both effects result 
i n underestimated site benefits. 
In response to the t heoretical and empirical problems associated 
with travel -cost methods in general, and congestion impacts in part-
icular, Pajooyan, {1978) as well as Oeyak and Smith {1978) have con-
structed analytical models for outdoor recreation using Becker's (1971) 
household production function {HPF) theory. HPF mode l s of consumer 
behavior treat individuals differently than conventional methods . 
Instead of being consumers of final goods and services, households 
are assumed to purchase intermediate products and combine them with 
various time inputs to pr oduce commodities for final consumption . 
The implications of HPF theory as applied to outdoor recreation 
are twofo ld; (1) demand cur ve s can be estimated using obse rved data 
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rather than possibly biased data, and (2) the implicit prices (values) 
fo r recreation and congestion ca n be determined. These values can be 
shown to be the marginal costs of producing a recreation commodity and 
a congestion reduction commodity, respectively. The Pajooyan model is 
presented below. 
Recreationists are assumed to have utility functions of the form, 
U ~(R,C,Z) 
where; 
and, 
R the recreation commodity produced by 
households. 
C a congestion reduction commodity. 
Z all other goods. 
au > 
31( 
0 ; au > 0 
R" 
au > 0 rr 
When individuals encounter congestion at a site, they are assumed 
to produce C by combining variables such as time, gasoline , and car 
se rvices, in order to reduce the effects of the congestion, that is 
they recreate at some other site or at another section of the initial 
site. 
Si nce R, C, and Z are assumed to be procuded by households, their 
production functions are given by 
R r( XR TR) 
C c(Xc Tel 
Z z(Xz Tz) 
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where; 
X; goods and services requ i red to produce i, i = R,C,Z. 
T; time inputs necessary to produce i, i = R,C,Z. 
The arguments of the recreator's dema nd function are defined 
through utility maximization. Since commodity prices are not obser-
vable , a two-stage procedure is used; stage one yields the recreators 
budget constraint, and in stage two utility is maximized 
subject to the generated budget constraint. 
Stage one 
For any household (or individual), a cost minimization problem 
can be written as: 
where; 
MINIMIZE 
3 
~1 
3 
P X + W ,·k1 T1· xi i 
S.T. V(X,T) - V 0 
Px; = the market price of input X; 
W = wage rate 
X goods input vector = .[XR,Xc,Xz] 
T time input vector= [TR,Tc,Tz] 
R,C,Z 
V produced commodity vector = [R,C,Z] 
The first order conditions are 
Px; - A Vx; = 0 R,C,Z 
W - A T; 0 R,C,Z 
V(X, T}-V = 0 
The first order conditions imply the following demand curves for X; 
and T;. 
; 
X; X (Px; ;W;V;) 
; 
T; = t (W;Px; ;V ;) 
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Substituting X; and T; into the origi nal cost function (assuming 
no joint production) yields 
r c z 
C(Px,W,X) = C (PxR.W,R) +C (Pxc.W,C) + C (Pxz,W,Z) 
The implicit, or shadow, prices of R,C ,Z are given by their 
marginal costs 
ac ac r 
"R MCR = aR = aR = rrr(Pxr.W,R) 
ac ace 
"c MCc = 3C = ac = rrc(Pxc.W,C) 
ac acz 
"z = MCz = az = az = rr r (Pzr,W,Z) 
The budget constraint can now be written as 
where; 
V Y + T; ·W (full income constraint) 
Y = disposable income 
Stage two 
The individual's utility function is now maximized subject to 
his/her budget constraint: 
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MAXIMIZE U = u(R,C,Z) 
S.T. nR·R + nc·R + nz·Z Y 
First order conditions of the maximization are: 
0 R,C,Z 
where; 
the marginal utility of the ith commodity, R,C,Z 
the marginal utility of income 
The first order conditions generate a demand curve for recreation 
that has the implicit prices of a reacreation commodity, a congestion 
reduction commodity, and income as arguments. The commodity Z can be 
dropped for convenience, since it is assumed constant. 
DR d( nR, nc, 7) 
d(MCR, MCc, 'n 
The marginal cost arguments can be exactly specified by assuming 
some form of production function (Cobb-Douglas, CES, etc) and 
performing the necessary calculations. For his empirical work, 
Pajooyan assumed a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
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Using an econometics procedure that was found to yield statisti-
cally consistant results, the demand function's parameters were found 
to be: 
_1. 38 _1.74 1.27 
OR 1.42 ~R ~c V 
_ I . 3 8 
1.42 MCR 
_ I . 74 
MCc 
I . 2 7 
v 
The "prices" of the recreation and congestion reduction commodi-
ties are to be calculated using observed data, for the purchases of 
gas, food , and equipment, and time allocation. Using these data with 
an appropriate production function and cost minimizing procedure can 
yield re liable est imates of the marginal costs of producing Rand C. 
Also of significant interest is the fact that the HPF model 
allows a determination the value which recreators place on various 
levels of congestion by observing the various amounts of the conges -
t ion reduction commodity produced by recreators in response to conges-
tion. Large quantities of C would indicate overconsumption of a 
particular site (or under allocation of resources to that site). 
The absence of C production wo uld clearly indicate that site use 
rates had not yet reached levels at which additional expense would 
be incurred to avoid congestion. 
Consumer surplus 
An often used measure of welfare is consumer surplus (CS) . CS 
is defined to be the area under a consumer ' s demand curve, so that 
increases in expenditure due to congestion will serve to shift the 
18 
demand curve to the right (increase), and yield an increase in CS. 
Conversely , recreators may reduce expenditures by decreasing the num-
ber of days devoted to recreation which would yield a decrease in CS. 
To arrive at consumer surplus values it is necessary to calculate 
the area beneath the demand curve between two points (prices) of 
reference. This amounts to integrating the demand between the 
reference points which in this case were the recreator ' s observed 
price for that trip and a ma ximum price greater than all observed 
prices , i.e., the intercept of the demand curve on the price axis CS 
is def i ned as: 
where: 
D(P1 !0) =a recreator's demand curve as a function of prices and current income 
P1 observed price 
P0 ma ximum pri ce 
Contingency-valuation methodology 
In contrast with travel-cost valuation models, which yield 
indirect estimates of the benefits individual's receive from a good 
or service , contingency valuation (bid-game) methods involve direct 
estimates of consumers' willingness-to-pay for a goon or service by 
the individuals themselves. The use of contengency valuation , or 
bid-game, techniques usually entails creating a hypothetical situa-
tion designed to elicit personal estimates of willingness-to-pay or 
willingness-to- be-compensated for a change in the provision of a good 
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or service. Whether payment or compensation quantities are desired 
depends on initial property right assi gnments . To summarize, when 
contingency valuation methods are used to elicit willingness-to-pay 
responses , what is sought is the amount of money income an individual 
is willing to give up in order to prevent (or achieve) a utility 
decrease (i ncrease) . 
It is apparent that conti ngency valuation methodology relies on 
a subjective assessment of value by individuals . This fact gives rise 
to several problems, bo th theoretical and empirical . There has been 
considerable cont roversy as to whether bid-game responses are based 
on equivalent variation (EV) or compensating variation (CV). 
An i ndi vi dual's bid can be defined as: 
and 
where : 
v(P; I) 
e(P;v(P;I)) 
the indirect utility function exp ressing 
an individual's utility level at prices 
P and income I. 
a function relating expenditures necessary 
to maintain util ity v(P;I) at prices P. 
The expenditure necessary to maintain the utility level given by 
v(P;Il at prices P and (money) income 10 is !0 • Hence, equations 1) 
and 2) above can be rewr itten as: 
A Hick's compensated demand curve (for any good or service) is: 
this implies: 
and 
a e(P;v(P;I)) 
d p 
P! 
EV, J oe(P;v(PJ;lo)) dP 
P0 d p 
P! 
cv, J •e(P ;v(Po;Io)) dP 
Po J P 
Freeman (1976) has shown that for an environmental quality 
variable, Q, the marginal willingness-to- pay for a change (increase) 
in Q is given by: 
this implies: 
and 
where: 
w ; _ oe(P;Q;u) 
J Q 
Ql 
EV , J i:ie(PU ;Q;ul) dQ 
Qo " Q 
20 
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There is a clear, theoretical difference between EV and CV based 
res ponses, but Willig (1976) has shown that when a commodity 
consumes only a small part of the individual's budget and the income 
elasticity is small, EV approximates CV . Specif icall y the rela tion-
ship is: 
~1here: 
cs 
~ income elasticity of demand 
CS consumer surplus for the ordinary 
demand curve 
income 
now that , since CS falls between EV and CV, it can be used as an 
estimate of either . However, a study done by Bishop and Heber lein 
(1979), compared actual market transactions for goose hunting permits, 
with bids and found 1~illingness - to-pay bids significantly lower and 
willingness-to-sell bids much higher than the market surplusses . They 
suggest using willingness-to- pay (EV) bidsas a lower bound and 
willingness-to- sell (CV) bids as an upper bound on value . 
The nature of bid-game methodology raises the question of 
strategic behavio r, or purposeful bias . Due and Friedlaender (1977) 
recognize two obvious incentives for i ndividuals to distort their 
answers . The hypothetical nat ure of the bid-game usually mea ns that 
no payment is required . Individuals are given the incentive to bid 
according to what they would like to see done, not how they might 
behave in the market place. The converse of this possibi l ity is also 
true . The chance that a large enough bid may increase current use 
costs provides ample i ncentive for downward bias. 
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Brookshire, et al. (1976) have shown that individuals may attempt 
to impose their "true" bid on all ot her respondents by trying to shi ft 
the mea n bid upward or downward, depending on the situation. For the 
case of envi ronmental improvement, a strategically behaving "environ-
mentalist" would bid high while a strategically behaving "non- environ-
mentalist" would bid lm;, even if their respective true willingness-to-
pay or sell were similar. 
In contrast to Bishop and Heberlein, Brookshire, et al. (1976) 
feel that zero, or near zero, bids may be more an expression of dissat -
isfaction with the game than strategic bidding . Furthermore, they 
argue, bias may be absent when respondents feel that their bids will 
have little effect in reality. It may be the case that when indivi-
duals have little or nothing to gain by lying, they respond accurately. 
In addition to strategic behavior, Freeman (1979) cites other 
potential sources of bias . The possibilities include: (1) attitudes 
respondents possess toward the vehicle of payment, (2) innaccuracies as 
a result of apathy , (3) bid start ing poi nt bias, and (4) pe r sona lity 
conflicts between interviews and re spondents . 
Though the reasons for viewing bid-game results with suspicion are 
valid, several studies seem to indicate that if bias is present, it may 
not be significant . Randall, et al . (1974) have found that if the 
bid- game is carefu l to project credibility and realism, then bias 
should not be a prob lem. As evidence, they cite the similar ity of the 
results of their study with the results of other studies examining t he 
same type of problem (valuing air quality/pollution abatement), but 
using diffe rent valuation methods. 
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Bohm (1972) pro vides additional credibility to bid-games by find-
ing no significant differences between the results of five different 
bid-game formats for television in Swede n. Bo hm states that by posit-
ing several possible payment schemes and not choosing one until all 
bids are collected will provide enough uncertainty regarding the game 
and outcome to prevent simple strategic behavior . 
The usual procedure in contingency valuation methodology is to 
coll ect bids , aggregate them into a socia l willingness-to- pay function 
and use this function to measure the socia l welfare surrounding the 
proposed change(s). This requires interpersonal compa ri sons of uti l ity 
between respondents (Sinden, 1974) . Such comparisons are more art than 
science and can produce innaccurate results. Furthermore, the aggre-
gate bid curve is dependent upon the initia l distribution of income. 
However, Brookshire, et al . (1976), have shown that when income effects 
and t he postulated welfare changes are small, the aggregate curve will 
provide a va l id measure of socia l we lfare . 
There are obviously problems using a bid-game to value a non-
market priced resource . This does not imply that such methods should 
be considered worthless. While contingency valuation techniques may 
not provide exact answers, they ca n at leas t give insight and direc-
tion to the problem of study. Their continued use will no doubt 
generate methodological refinements that which eliminate some, if not 
all, of the aforementioned problems. 
TH E Et1PIRICAL STUDY 
This study included winter recreators in the Logan Canyon 
Recreation Area (LCRA). 
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Since a secondary data source co ntaining information relavent to 
this study does not exist, it was necessary to gather the required 
information using a survey (appendix A contains a copy of the survey 
questionaire). No attempt was made to generate a random sample of 
respondents due to the fact that the population of recreators is, for 
the most part, unknown. Instead, individuals were interviewed while 
in the various parking sites found throughout the LCRA. 
Though severa l kinds of recreation occurs in the LCRA during the 
winter months, the majority of the people are engaged in either 
cross-country skiing or snowmobile riding . This is reflected in th·e 
breakdown of the survey. Two-hundred and twenty-one usable surveys 
were call ected; ninety-two from snoWI'lobil er s, one-hundred-t\venty-ei ght 
from cross-country skiers. One survey eac h for a dogsledder and a 
snowshoer were collected but not used in the analysis. 
The survey data had four primary purposes: 1) to cursorily 
examine socioeconomic characteristics of recreators, 2) to provide 
information allowing the estimation of demand curves., consumers 
surplus values, and Pajooyan's congestion reduction commodity for 
each recreation activity, 3) to generate, via a bid game, willingness-
to-pay responses regarding motorized/ non-motorized recreator conflict; 
4) to facilitate and compare the estimation of recreators' consumer 
surplus based on travel -cost demand curves and bid games . 
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Between the two groups, there were significant differences in 
various socioeconomic factors. More than one-half (5 3.9%) of the 
skiers interviewed were students . Of the remaining skiers, 38% were 
craftsmen/operato rs . More snow machine riders (30.4%) fell in the 
craftsmen/operator category. Far fewer snowmobile rs were students or 
professionals (13% each). 
The income distribution was also qu ite different . Although the 
mean income for both groups was approximately S17,000, income for 
cross-country skie rs 1~as concentrated i n the lower current income 
levels. Ove r three fourths (77 .8%) of skiers ' incomes were l ess than 
$15,000, with 32 . 8% receiving less than $5,000 per year. Most (62%) 
snowmobilers had incomes in the $10,000 to $25 ,000 range . 
Finally, many more snowmobilers were raising children, 73 . 9% vs . 
20 . 6$ for the skier group . It was beyond the scope of this project to 
explain respondents' behavior using a socioeconomic analysis . It is 
1~o rth noting hm;ever, that the differences between the two recreation 
groups are significant, and that there was little or no crossover 
between the groups . 
Co nsumers ' su rplus estimation 
The demand curves used in the calculation of CS values were 
derived using t he Clawson technique out lined earlier . First, a demand 
curve for "the entire recreation experience" ~1as estimated by regress-
ing visitation rates against price (t ravel cost) . The "general" curve 
contains site benefits as well as the benefits accruing to travel, 
food, lodging, etc .•• To arrive at a demand curve for the site, which 
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will yield site specific CS estimates, one more step was taken. For 
the general (step-one) curve, it was assumed that price was equal to 
(TC + fee) with the fee set equal to zero. The site specific (step-
two) curve is estimated by: (1) assuming an increase in fees imposed, 
(2) substituting the non-zero fee into the recreator's demand func-
tion , (3) noting the changes in quantities of recreation demanded due 
to a fee increase, and (4) regressing quantity demanded against fees. 
Repeated application of this procedure will trace out a demand curve 
for the site exclusion of travel, food, and miscel laneous benefits. 
Survey data was found to vary little from respondent to respon-
dent. Thus, sufficient data points were available from every particu-
lar site in the LCRA to estimate statistically significant demand 
curves, so the est imation was made for the LCRA as a whole. This 
procedure should not be too alarming upon closer inspection, since 
the LCRA possesses a high degree of homogeneity among its recreation 
areas. In fact, many "sites" are not unique, but are simply different 
entry points to a large area . Travel costs were estimated using round 
trip mile traveled multiplied by the Utah State Uinversity operating 
expense for the type of .vehicle driven. 
The possible effects of excluding time values were mentioned 
earlier; however, since time quantities for travel to the LCRA for most 
respondents are low and estimation of time values is complicated and 
inexact, any bias introduced here is possibly small enough to ignore . 
In order to compare CS and bids it was necessary to estimate 
demand curves (functions) for each type of recreator. Using ordinary 
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least squares regression procedures yielded general recreation demand 
curves of the for: 
6. 70 + 00006 I - .04P* (R2 
.04) ( .92) (1.98) 
D;x = 3.67 + 000009 - .17P* (R2 .03) 
( . 46) (1.8) 
(*significant at the . 05 level) 
where: 
Dl 
s stage-one demand (days) by snowmobilers 
Dl 
X stage- one 
skiers 
demand (days) by cross-country 
mo ney income 
p travel and on-site costs 
Durbin-Watson statements indicates no autocorrelation . CS estimates 
can be expressed as the the integral of the demand curves: 
where: 
csl si 
csl xi 
csl si 
csl xi 
6.71 P + .00006 I · P - .02P2 fp1 
Po 
3.67 P + .000006 I · P - .08SP2 / 1 
Po 
st ep-one consumer surplus for 
snowmobiler i 
step- one consumer surplus for cross-
country skier i 
P1 ,P0 =are as defined previously 
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Appendi x (B) contains recreators' consumer surplus values for 
the entire recreation experience. The total consumer surplus for 
snowmobilers (~ CSi) was $47,317.00. Average consumer surplus (total 
CS/snowmobilers) equaled $514,00. For cross-cou ntry skiers, an 
average surplus of $23.00 . 
In order to isolate the benefits being produced by the site 
itself, a pair of step-two demand curves were estimated using their 
respective step-one curves. One should note that these step-two 
curves are aggregate demand curves . The demand curves are: 
Ds 610.81 
Dx 354.23 
4.84P (R2 = 96%) 
11.63 p2 (R2 = 85%) 
As before, consumer surplus is found by integrating the demand 
curves with respect to price. For these aggregate curves however, 
only one integration was performed on each curve, from Po = o to P1 
a maximum price. This procedure yields the total consumer surplus 
being produced by the site. The estimates of total consumer surplus 
are expressed by: 
where: 
610.81 P - 2.42P2 I 126 
0 
354.23 P- 5.81P2 1
0
15 
CS2 s step-two consumer surplus for snowmobilers 
CS2 x step-two consumer surplus for cross-
country skiers 
the maximum price is $126. 00 for snowmobilers 
and $15 for cross-country skiers. 
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For step-two demand, total CS for snow-mobilers and cross-country 
skiers was $38 ,440 and $2,696 .00 respectively. Average CS for 
snowmobilers was approximately $4 18 .00 and $2 1. 00 for cross-country 
skiers. 
As was expected, there was a noticable, though not substantial, 
difference between step-one and step-two CS. This implies that for 
the sites in question, most benefits are generated by the sites 
themselves and not from incidental activities. The large differences 
in CS between snowmobilers and cross-country skiers was primarily due 
to the costs faced by each group. 
The problems noted earlier imply that demand curves CS would tend 
to undervalue their respective commodities. If this is the case, then 
al l figures presented here can be viewed as lower bounds. It is not 
known how much downward bias is present if any; however, bia s would 
have to be substantial to necessitate a change in the conclusions that 
are to be drawn from the study. 
Production of C 
The Pajooyan model of recreator behavior when faced with 
congestion, allows for a new method of examining congestion effects. 
It is assumed that in the face of congestion recreators will combine 
various inputs at their disposal and produce a "congestion reduction 
commodity" in an effort to reduce the effects of congestion of their 
rec reation experience . The higher the quantity (of encounters) or 
quality (intensity) of the congestion, the larger the amount of C 
produced. No C production implies no congestion encounters. 
It was as sumed that any recreator not recreating at hi s/ her 
fa vor ite site, or preferred site, due to congestion at that site, is 
producing some quantity of C by moving to the site currently used . 
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Out of the sample of 22 1 respondents, only three had chosen to 
reloca t e due to congestion at their origina lly chosen site . While many 
recreators were not at their favor ite site, more often than not their 
choice was based on a desire for va riety or better snow condit i ons . 
The calculation of t he congestion reduction commodity, C, was 
straightforward . The distance between a recreator ' s preferred, but 
congested, site and the site actual ly used was multiplied by 2 
(impl ying round trip distance) . The resulting quantity was t hen 
multiplied by the recreato r's travel costs per mile, a function of the 
type of vehic le dri ven. 
Us ing mileage figures obtained by t he survey , the three cost of 
"C" produced was ca lc ulated to be: 
$1.86 C1 
s1.10 c2 
$0 . 39 c3 
Since time costs were impossible to determine and CPM can only be 
considered averages, CJ, C2, C3 should be viev1ed as lower bounds. 
However, even as a lov1er limi t, the almost total lac k of C procuction 
tends to indicate a lack of significant congestion in the LCRA. 
Bid- game 
The bid-game portion of the su rvey consisted of three questions. 
Re spondents were told tha t the posited situations were purely 
31 
hypothetical in an effort to reduce strategic bidding. Respondents 
were asked to answer "yes" or "no" to an i ni ti al bid amount. Yes 
responses resulted in larger and larger bids until a "no" response was 
encountered. An initial no response would result in a lowering of the 
amount asked until a "yes" response was encountered. 
Two questions in the survey, numbers one and three, were designed 
to obtain estimates of general and site specific recreation values 
respectively. Question 1 asked how much recreators were willing to 
pay to recreate at the site under current consumption . The respondent 
could either pay or move to another site with no fee. 
Question 3 added the stip ul ation that all other reasonably 
attainable sites were posing the same fees as the site in the bid game. 
Recreators cou ld pay to use the site being consumed or move and pay 
at any other site. These questions dealt with recreation substitutes 
and were part of another study. 
The bid game concerned with congestion effects was contained in 
question (Q2). (Q2) attempted to assess the congestion cost complied 
by the public versey regard'ing the rights of motorized vs. non-motor-
ized recreato rs in the LCRA. If this conflict is significant, then 
members of either group should be willing to part with some of their 
resources in an attempt to exclude members of the other gourp. (Q2) 
asked how much individuals were willing to pay to keep the site they 
were presently using free of the other type of recreator. 
Examination of the (Q2) bids (Appendix B) revealed a marked diff-
erence in the responses of the cross -country skiers and snowmobilers. 
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Ro ughly seventy per-cent of the snowmobilers sampled bid zero for 
"skier abatement". Total willingness-to-pay (i.e., the sum of all 
bids) was $80.96. The average bid with excluded skiers was $0 .88, 
with a standard deviation of 1.60, and variance of the average bid for 
the existing atraction was $0.85, which is not statistically signifi-
cantly different from the exclusion use bid to 2.56. 
Responses for the skiers were more frequently non-zero and larger 
in magnitude than those of the snowmobile group. On ly 29~ claimed 
they would not pay to exclude snowmobilers. For this group, total 
willingness-to-pay was $254.72 . The skiers' average bid was $1 .99. 
The standard deviation and variance for this group were 1.72 and 2.98 
respectively. For cross-country skiers, the average bid for the exis-
ting condition was $0.92 which was much different the the exclusive 
bid. A t-test showed difference in the mean bids ($.88, $1.99) of 
each group, and the two bids by the snowmobilers to be statistically 
different. Even with the di vergence of bids it was surprising to 
examine the bids of the skiers. Much of the joy of cross-country 
skiing is touted as being in the quiet and solitude of the outdoors. 
This serenity can easily be shattered by the noise associated with 
only one snow-machine. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
skiers would be willing to pay a relatively great deal for a guaran-
teed uninterupted recreation experience. However, roughly one third 
of the sample refused to offer a non-zero, let alone large, bid. Even 
the non-zero bidders taking part in this study did not seem as anxious 
to pay as large an amount as might be expected if i ntergroup conflicts 
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(congestion) are viewed as being serious. It is clear, however, that 
the results support the conclusion that congestion extremitities are 
primarily one-way for the two groups. Cross-country skiers perceive 
the absence of snowmobilers as a signigicant improvement in that the 
bids increases significantly. Snowmobilers are apparently indiffer-
ent. 
There were relatively large numbers of respondents from both 
groups who bid zero. Although an attemp t to ascertain whether or not 
the respondent who bid zero was trul y at the margin or simply pro-
testing their payment scheme was ~ade, it was simply not possible to 
be certain about the meaning of zero bids. Known protest votes were 
disregarded, but strategic zero voting was hard to detect. It can 
only be assumed that any strategic behavior here is insignifi cant . 
The procedures used seemed to be in general agreement with 
respect to congestion effect. The production of the congestion 
reduction commodity was infrequent and both groups tended to bi d low 
or zero for the exclusion of the other. The co nclusi on drawn is that 
congest ion, be it among or between these two groups, is si~ply not a 
significant problem in the LCRA. 
Two observations were made regarding total consumer surplus and 
the bids related to the total experience . Willig (1976) states that 
for commoditi es requiring expenditures which are a small portion of 
income and possessing reasonably small incomes elasticities , consumer 
surplus should approximate equivalent variation as a measure of 
welfare recall that this difference is equal to (~CS2/2I). Consumer 
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surplus values in this study were consistently higher than any of the 
bids (see Appendix B) . Si nce CS for the site was an aggregate number, 
any comparison between site generated CS and bids bias to be done 
using total (sum) or average figures. Regardless of the methods used 
in comparison, the bids were a small fraction of CS. 
The most obvious reason for the disparity between CS and bids is 
the proportion of income spent in the participation of each activity. 
Snowmobile riders incur relati vel y large costs in the purchase of 
snowmachines, trailers, and accessories. Since the average snowmobil-
er's income was in the lower-middle region, these high initial costs 
along with the high travel and on site costs probably had an effect 
of the magnitudes of the elicited bids. While the costs involved with 
activity of cross-country skiing were considerably lower, so too were 
the incomes of those engaging in that activity . The second observa-
tion was co ncerned solely with the bids. When examined along with 
an average individual demand curves (not the aggregate, site specific 
curve), there was a striking similarity between the averrage bids for 
each group and the intercept of their respective demand curves on the 
price axis. This results suggest that bid 9ames, which use pricing 
such as entry fees , may produce not an equivalent variation measure 
of welfare but rather the individuals reservation price (i.e., the 
maximum price/quantity point or an individuals dema nd curve). 
Further, resea rch is clearly indicated. 
The results of the bid game should be examined with one addition-
al problem kept in mind. Several studies indicate that hypothesied 
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behavior does not always correspond with actual behavior (Schuman and 
Johnson (1976); Bishop and Heberlein (1976)). Also, while this 
empirical bias may often be present, Brookshire , et al . (1976) and 
Cicchetti and Smith (1976) feel that it i s normally less than the bias 
associated with compensating-variation based bids of welfare changes . 
The general conclusion is that EV based bids should be viewed as a 
l ower bound welfare change since empirical and theoretical source of 
bias all tend to undervalue the item in question. 
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Conclusions 
The general conclusion made in light of this study is that 
congestion in the LCRA has not reached a significant level. The 
implication for public policy makers is that restricting use of the 
various areas in the LCRA to one activity or another is not justified 
in terms of congestion. The resources that could be used in the 
implimentation and maintenence of such a policy would be better used 
elsewhere. 
Two significant problems have also been identified through this 
study: 
1) Consumer surplus may not be an appropriate measure of welfare 
for these kinds of activities unless income elasticities and 
the activities relative importance in the individuals budget 
are more accurately specified. 
2) Bid game questions worded in the manner of this survey may 
not provide an equivalent compensation measure of welfare 
change, but rather, an i ndividuals maximum reservation price. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate t he congestion problem 
in t he Log an Canyon Recreation Area using valuation techniques 
developed through earlier research. An analytical model based on 
Becker's (1971) househol d production theory provided the justifica-
tion for the estimation of congestion costs based on observed 
recreator data. This cost can be measured by calculating the added 
cost of recreating at a site other than the recreator's first choice. 
The contigency, or bid-game , method of valuing non-market priced 
resources (and externalities) was al so utilized. 
A survey was administered to cross - country sk iers and snow 
machine riders in the Logan Canyon Recreatio n Area in an attempt 
to examine congestion effects among, and bet1veen these two groups. 
The survey was designed to obt ain information necessary for the 
estimat i on of recreation demand curves, consumer surplus, and the 
calculation of the congestion reduction commodity . In addition, 
a bid-game was conducted which asked cross-country skiers how much 
they were 1vill to pay to exclude snowmob ilers and vice-versa. 
Travel-cost based demand curves were estimated for the recrea-
tor's entire recreation experience. From these curves, one each for 
snowmobilers and cross'country skiers, demand curves for the site 
were estimated . Integration procedures 1vere performed on both sets 
of curves resul t ing in consumer surp lus estimates . As expected, the 
consumer surplus estimates from the site specific demand curves were 
of a smaller magnitude than those from suing the general recreation 
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curves. The difference between both measures of individual welfare 
seemed significant, if not substantial. Given the tendency for travel 
cost demand curves to underestimate site benefits, all consumer 
surplus estimates were viewed as lower bounds. 
Fu rther analysis of the survey results showed three (out of a 
possible 221) instances of C production. C1, C2, and C3 were calcu-
l ated to be $1.86, $1.10 and 50 .39 respectively. The exclusion of 
time costs implies that these amounts undervalue C somewhat . 
Bid game results were somewhat one si ded , as was expected . 
Skie rs were more willing to pay to exclude snowMobilers with 72% of 
the skiers offering non-zero bids. The mean bid for skiers was 51.99. 
Compared to a $0 .92 congested bid. Roughly seventy-percent of the 
snowmobilers sampled bid zero for the eliminati on of skiers at their 
sites . The mean bid for this group was $01.88, compared to a 50 .85 
congested bid. The individual congested effect is indicated. 
The bids were found to differ significantly from consumer surplus 
estimates. This difference implied that consumer surplus may not be 
an approximation appropriate of welfare gains or losses for these 
kinds of acti vities unless efforts are made to specify the relation-
ship of these activities in the individuals budget more fully. 
Also observed during this study was a tendency for the bids to be 
much closer to the individuals maximum reservation than to the surplus 
price. Asking the willingness to pay in daily, or per use, terms 
li kely does not yield a equivalent compensation measure of individual 
welfare. 
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Due to infrequent, small quantities of congestion reduction 
commodity production and relatively l ow bids for exclusion suggests 
that exclusion policies for winter recreation activities should be 
carefully reviewed in the Logan Canyon Area or perhaps elsewhere . 
Downward bias was assumed to be insignificant for the bids. The 
establishment through further research of an upper bound may provide 
addi t ional insight on the question of bias. Another option, although 
probably more costly, would be a study using the methods of Bishop 
and Heberlein (1979), and Bohm (1972). The uncertainty of outcomes 
coupled with actual cash payments should be enough to eliminate any 
bias from the results. 
Research aimed at determining the type of questions that are 
sure to elicit equivalent variation based bids is also suggested by 
this study. 
Finally, if consumer surplus is to be used in studies similar 
to this one, a model that determines the relationship of CS and 
equ i val ent variation based bids would be very useful. 
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Appendix A 
Time of interview 
Site ----------------------
\<INTER RECREATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
Hi! am collecting information for a Utah State University study on 
winter sports in Logan Canyon. The results from this study can be used 
for recreation plan ning by State and Federal agencies. My question-
naire will only take a few minutes. None of the information you give 
us can be traced to you, and therefore is confidential. The results 
come from all our interviews taken together. We are especially inter-
ested in finding out how you feel about this area (ID the area from 
maps). 
Interviewe r identify if: Sno~nnobiler ---------------------
Snowshoer 
Cross-Country Skier---------------
Othe r ---------------------------
Also, get respondent to identify gene ral use area on map (if possib l e) . 
1. Is this your first trip to this area? 
1. Yes (if yes, go to 5) 
2. No 
2. How many years have you been coming to this area? 
3 . About hOI< many trips a year do you make to this area? 
4. Is this t he area you like most? 
1. Yes (if yes, go to 6) 
2 . No (go to 5) 
If no, to Question 1 or 4: 
5. Where is the area you like most? (Identify on map, if possible, 
or ask mileage from current site) --------------·------------(go to 8) 
If yes , to Question 4: 
6. If there another area you would prefer but didn't use for some 
reason? 
l. Yes 
2. No (go to 9) 
If yes, to Question 6: 
7. Where is the area you would prefer? ( Identify on map , if possible, 
or ask mileage from current site) --------------
8. !.Jhy did you not go to your most preferred area? 
1. Too many snowmobile r s (estimate how ma ny, if possible) 
2. Too many cross- country skiers(estimate hoi'/ many, if po ssible) 
3 . Regu l at1o ns at the site (specify) -------------
4. Faciliti es at t he site (specify) 
5. Other (describe) -------------------
9 . How many in your party including your self? ----------
10 . Is yours a family or non-family group? 
1. Family (go to 12) 
2. Non-family (go to 11) 
11. Do you share trip expenses? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
12 . What type of vehicle did you travel in? 
13 . Where do you live? 
City-----------
State -----------
Zi pcode ---------- (get all zips if possib l e) 
14 . How long have you lived there?--------------
15. How l ong did it take you to get her from your home? 
----- hrs. (to nearest quarter hour) 
16. How many days do you expect to be at this area? (overn ight is 
17. 
days) days (if 1 day go to 19) ( if more t han 1 day go 
to 17) 
Is this 
trip? 
1. Yes 
2 . No 
area the only recreation site you i ntend to visit on this 
(go to 19) 
(go to 18) 
18 . What are the other areas you will visit for this kind of reacrea -
tion? (list) 
19. What expe nditu res have you made fo r this trip in addition to your 
travel cost? 
----------------------- fue l for on site activit i es 
------------- food 
---------------------- lodging 
----------------------- other 
20. As you know, planning and deve 1 opment of 1~i nter recreation areas 
is a costly activity . The agencies invol ved have little idea how 
people value these winter recreation areas and we are going to get 
some idea of this value. 
Try to place yourself in the situation I am going to describe. 
This is a hypothetical situation, and it does not mean there are 
pl ans for a permit to use this area . We are onl y interested in 
how you and other recreators value areas of this type . 
Suppose that this area were cl osed to access except by purchase of 
a daily permit which would be sold to each person for entry and 
the money used to provide for maintenance and patrol of the area 
(similar to a ski resort) . If such a permit cost$'--.,-,.------
would you pay for one? If the pe rmi t cost $ ? $ ______ __ 
What is the maximum you \~auld pay? $. ________ _ 
If the area were designated for use only by (snowmobi l ers or cross-
country skiers, which ever the activity to be participated in), 
would you pay$ for the permi t (same as maximum above) . 
Would you pay$ ? $ ? What is the maximum you 
would pay? $. _____ _ 
Suppose that all other sites were also under a permit system, and 
that these perrmits cost $5 . 00 each. What would you be wil ling to 
pay for a permit on this site? 
$ $ $ ----------
If no, why would you not buy this permit? ----------------------
Finally, I would like to ask you a couple of questions about your-
self, if you don't mi nd. None of this information can be t raced 
back to you . 
21. What kind of job do you (a head of household) have? (include 
student) 
Head of household: ------- - ------- - - ---
Spouse , or other perso ns: - ----- ----- - -----
22 . Please indicate the number on the card corresponding to the 
highest l evel of school you (or head of household) have completed: 
1. grade 0-8 
2. some high school 
3 . grade 12 (high school graduate) 
4. some college or additional t raining 
5. college or technical school deg ree 
6. post graduate degree 
23 . What was you annual family income before taxes in 1979 ? (identify 
group) 
1. 0- $5,000 
2. $5,000 - $10 ,000 
3. $15,000 - $20,000 
4. $20,000 - $25,000 
5. $25,000 - $30,000 
6. $30,000 - $40,000 
7. above $40,000 
24. Do you have children? lf yes, how many in each age class? 
Years of age 
0 - 5 
5 - 10 
10 - 15 
15 - 20 
20 + 
25 . Do yo u have any comments you wou l d l ike to make about this area? (Use othe r side of page for answe r. ) 
Thank you for your cooperation . This study should be completed by the 
end of 1980 . If you are interested in the results, or have any ques-
tions, you can call or write Dr. John Keith, Department of Economics, 
Uta h State University, Logan, Utah 84321 . 
Sta rting Price 
1. 00 3. 00 5.00 10.00 20.00 
. 90 2. 75 4.75 9.50 18.50 
. 80 2.50 4.50 9. 00 17.00 
• 70 2.25 4.25 8 .50 15.50 
. 60 2. 00 4.00 8. 00 14 . 00 
.so 1. 75 3. 75 7. 50 12.50 
. 40 1.50 3. 50 7.00 11.00 
. 30 1.25 3.25 6. 50 10.00 
. 20 1.00 3. 00 6.00 
. 10 5. 50 
0 5. 00 
Why would you not want to buy suc h a pass? ------------
What is the maximum price at which you would be 1<illing to buy such 
an annual pass? 
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SNOWMOBILERS 
Travel Cost cs step 1 81 82 83 
24. 82 394 .804 0.0 3.5 5.0 
23 . 82 400.681 3. 0 3. 0 5. 0 
5.39 516.160 o.o 0.0 5.0 
6.39 509.545 o.o 0. 0 5.0 
21.03 515.363 4 .0 4. 0 4.0 
11.92 473.690 2. 0 2.0 4. 0 
7. 84 646 . 617 o.o 0.0 0.0 
43.04 372.989 0. 0 o.o o.o 
13.92 530.671 o.o o.o 0.0 
12 . 92 607 .833 2. 0 2.0 2. 0 
12 . 64 609.943 o.o 0.0 0. 0 
18 . 43 499.990 o.o 0.0 0. 0 
18.82 430 .667 0.0 o.o o.o 
16.70 613.633 0.0 0.0 o.o 
10.16 628. 777 o.o o.o o.o 
29.41 368 . 340 7.0 7.0 7. 0 
49.60 334.303 1.5 1.5 3.0 
17 . 62 539.154 0.0 o.o o.o 
31.18 476.945 o.o 0.0 3.0 
17 . 62 471.726 1.5 1.5 1.5 
12 . 35 506.248 5. 0 5.0 5.0 
18 . 43 533.461 3.0 3.0 3.0 
10 . 70 553 .075 o.o o.o 5.0 
18.92 496.705 0.0 o.o o.o 
18.92 496.705 o.o 0. 0 o.o 
23.92 495 . 563 o.o 0. 0 o.o 
16.70 511.663 o.o o.o 1.0 
15.29 555 . 678 o.o 0. 0 1.0 
13.47 691.093 1.0 1.0 1.0 
11.08 586 . 085 o.o 0. 0 3.0 
2. 81 609.723 0.0 0.0 o.o 
16.86 510 . 578 o.o 0. 0 o.o 
16.76 579 . 200 o.o 0. 0 0.0 
21.66 478.516 o.o 0.0 o.o 
17.29 575.294 2.0 2. 0 2.0 
11.29 548 . 939 o.o 0.0 1.0 
9.29 563.016 o.o o.o 0.0 
24.21 493 . 595 o.o 0.0 1.0 
15.29 555.678 o.o 0. 0 0.0 
6.35 621.094 3.0 3.0 0. 0 
11.29 584.552 o.o 0. 0 2.0 
14.06 599.271 1.0 1.0 1.0 
15.39 589.348 o.o 0.0 3.0 
19.06 529.051 o.o 0.0 5. 0 
19 . 06 529.051 o.o 0.0 0. 0 
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14 . 45 492.359 o.o 0. 0 o.o 
16.96 611.637 0. 0 o.o 1.0 
18.96 563.062 0. 0 0.0 1.0 
17.88 436.416 5. 0 5.0 5. 0 
21.22 443.783 0.0 0.0 o.o 
20.44 549.490 5.0 5.0 5. 0 
85 .19 167.867 5.0 5.0 5. 0 
15.64 553.182 1.5 2.0 5. 0 
5.82 662 . 326 4.0 4.0 5.0 
16.14 703 . 336 o.o 0.0 0.0 
7.16 504 .479 3.5 3.5 3. 5 
22 .84 502.923 o.o 0.0 0.0 
25 . 95 622 . 323 0.0 0. 0 5.0 
127.04 11.719 5.0 5.0 5.0 
39.27 423 . 219 0. 0 0.0 5. 0 
18.82 564.083 o.o 2.0 5.0 
58.93 378 . 192 0. 0 0.0 1.0 
53.33 416 .579 o.o 0.0 5. 0 
15 . 25 555.964 o.o 0.0 o.o 
10 . 24 664.093 o.o 0.0 1.0 
127.04 11 . 719 3. 0 3.0 3. 0 
22 . 19 475 . 032 0. 0 0.0 2.0 
8.37 606 . 034 1.0 1.0 1.0 
6. 77 580 . 980 3.0 3.0 3. 0 
51.37 430.311 2. 0 2.0 o.o 
11.00 479.570 o.o 0.0 5.0 
10.00 486.000 o.o o.o 5. 0 
17 . 25 575.589 o.o o.o o.o 
18.25 501.199 o.o 0.0 0.0 
21.43 512 .602 o.o o.o o.o 
23.00 501.830 o.o o.o 2.0 
19.27 494 . 365 o.o o.o 2. 0 
31.27 446 . 714 o.o 0.0 2.0 
18.00 536 .480 0.5 0.5 1.0 
30.00 495.000 o.o 0.0 0. 0 
8.15 772.163 o.o 1.0 3.0 
12 . 30 506 . 581 0.0 0.0 0.0 
8.20 534 . 215 0.0 0.0 1.0 
12.30 541.891 o.o o.o 1.0 
15.21 590.686 0.0 0.0 0.0 
5.31 703.725 o.o o.o o.o 
20.98 515 . 708 o.o 0.0 o.o 
17.14 440.967 o.o 0.0 3.0 
11.17 549 . 779 0.0 0.0 o.o 
12 . 20 542.587 o.o o.o 0.0 
20 . 19 488.237 0.0 0.0 2.0 
17.19 440.658 o.o o.o 2. 0 
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Travel Cost CS ste~ 1 B1 B2 B3 
8. 68 16 . 478 3. 5 5.0 3. 5 
3.10 28 . 558 5. 0 5.0 5.0 
4.20 25 . 178 0. 0 3. 0 o.o 
9.32 13 . 568 o.o 4.0 3.0 
5.40 24 .373 3. 0 4.5 3. 5 
4.74 23 . 595 1.0 1. 0 1.0 
6. 74 18.161 2.0 2.0 2. 0 
6.74 18. 161 2.0 2.0 2.0 
6.74 18 . 161 1.0 1.0 1.0 
5. 72 24 . 318 o.o 2.0 0.0 
4 . 21 25 .149 3.0 5.0 3. 0 
3.18 28 . 305 o.o 0.0 5.0 
1.16 35 . 019 0.0 4.0 o.o 
1.16 35 . 019 3. 0 3.0 5.0 
5.91 25 . 918 1.5 2.0 1.5 
7.91 16 . 067 2.0 5. 0 2.0 
2.16 31.608 0.5 1.0 1.0 
10.08 13 . 961 o.o 3.0 3.0 
6. 57 20 . 255 1.0 1.0 1.0 
6. 57 20 .255 1.0 1.0 1.0 
6.82 18 . 776 o.o 3.0 0.0 
3. 80 28 .291 0.0 1.0 3.0 
3. 58 28 .986 0.0 0. 0 1.0 
3. 58 28.986 0.0 1.0 3.0 
5.31 21 . 977 1.0 3.0 2.0 
3.25 29 . 063 o.o 0.0 0.0 
3. 25 29 . 063 o.o 0.0 0.0 
4 .87 24 .1 27 0.0 1.0 1.0 
3.87 26 .171 0.0 1.5 1.0 
5.00 22 .850 3.0 3.0 3. 0 
5.00 23 . 750 0. 0 0.0 o.o 
9. 25 15 . 848 2. 0 3. 5 2.0 
9.25 15 .848 2. 0 3.5 2. 0 
5.82 24 .892 o.o 0.0 3. 0 
4 . 31 38 .818 o.o 0.0 3. 5 
4.32 25 . 753 0.0 0. 0 1.0 
5.23 23 .090 o.o 2.0 0. 0 
2. 66 29.967 0.0 2.0 1.0 
2. 66 30 . 972 0.0 2.0 1.0 
9. 70 14.122 3.5 3.5 3. 5 
8. 70 13.496 3.5 3.5 3. 5 
5.04 24.533 o.o 0. 0 o.o 
5.04 24 . 533 o.o 0.0 0.0 
3.32 27.865 0.0 2.0 3. 0 
4.04 25 .657 0.0 0.0 3. 0 
4.04 25 .657 0.0 0.0 3. 0 
